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Abstract 
In this paper we address the question of whether the perceived level of corruption in a country 
may influence women’s inclination in self-refraining from applying for bank loans. Using a 
sample of 60,058 observations – drawn from the ECB-SAFE – related to SMEs chartered in 11 
Euro-area countries during the period 2009-2014, we first investigate whether female-led 
businesses are more likely, than male-led ones, to refrain from applying for bank credit. Finally, 
we assess whether corruption actually matters in the women’s decision not to relying on the 
bank-lending channel. Our results – robust to various model specifications – highlight that 
women-led SMEs face a higher probability to self-refrain from applying for loans vis-à-vis their 
male counterparts. In addition, although corruption appears strongly correlated to the self-
restraint attitudes of firms, our empirical analysis reveals that women-led SMEs generally tend to 
refrain from applying for loans, more than men, regardless of the quality of the surrounding 
environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Corruption is an important dimension of the quality of institutions. In reducing the level of trust, 
corruption makes economic transactions more costly and inefficient and, consequently, affects 
social development and economic growth.3 The level of corruption is generally different in 
industrialized, emerging, and developing countries. However, the picture of the gravity of the 
phenomenon is quite diversified also in the euro area, where Greece and Italy appear as the most 
corrupt economies, while Finland and the Netherlands as the least corrupt ones.4 At aggregate 
level, data highlight that countries characterized by greater degrees of corruption are also those 
where the gender gap is higher. If we look at the worldwide data on gender gap,5 significant 
gender inequalities – especially in economic participation and political empowerment – emerge 
even across European countries. Moreover, the individual level data – such as the ones provided 
by the survey of the Global Barometer of Corruption (Transparency International, various years) 
– show that women, on average, are less likely to engage in corrupt activities than men 
(Wängnerud, 2012; Agerberg, 2014). 
An interesting bulk of the literature has investigated the impact that institutional factors may 
have on the credit market. Notably, evidence shows that the efficiency of institutions, the 
enforcement of legal rights – namely, creditor rights protection and judicial enforcement (La 
Porta et al., 1997; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Djankov et al., 2008; Moro et al., 2016; Galli et al., 
2017a) – and the competitiveness of the banking market (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002) affect the 
behaviour of SMEs in regards to their propensity to apply for loans. However, little research has 
been done, so far, to investigate the effects that corruption may exert on the inclination of firms 
to access bank credit (see Galli et al., 2017b). 
																																								 																				
3 For a recent survey, see Dimant and Tosato (2017).	
4 See the Freedom from Corruption Index and the Corruption Perception Index at the following links, respectively: 
www.heritage.org/index/freedom-from-corruption and www.transparency.it/corruption-perceptions-index.  
5 See the Global Gender Gap Index, by country, at the following link: http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-
gap-report/rankings/ 
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Another strand of the literature has widely debated, with regards to a variety of countries, 
whether gender disparities arise in the bank-firm relationship – provided that the access 
conditions to bank credit play a decisive role in the survival and development of female-led 
SMEs (see, among others, Aristei and Gallo, 2016; Brush et al., 2001; Marlow and Patton, 2005; 
World Bank, 2011). The well-known problems faced by the SMEs, in general, in entering equity 
markets (Ayadi and Gadi, 2013; Kremp and Sevestre, 2013; Vermoesen et al., 2013) and in 
producing high quality collaterals (Öztürk and Mrkaic, 2014; Vos et al., 2007) have not surely 
helped firms during the recent financial crisis when the difficulties in the access to bank credit 
further sharpened. This is particularly evident if we look at the latest data from the Survey on the 
Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE). As a matter of fact, during the last years in Europe 
female-led firms, on average, have resorted less frequently to bank loans than their male 
counterparts – 30% and 37%, respectively (SAFE, various years). 
Interestingly, several contributions have shown that, on the demand side, women-led firms 
tend to self-refrain from applying for bank credit either because they anticipate a denial from the 
lender (inter alia, Freel et al., 2012; Moro et al., 2017) or because they own sufficient internal 
funds or resort to families and other social ties (inter alia, Guiso et al., 2004; Coleman and Robb, 
2009; Alesina et al., 2013). Finally, some contributions have focused on the role played by the 
level of social capital6 in the functioning of the credit market highlighting that a higher level of it 
may reduce the asymmetric information that characterizes the credit contract. This, in turn, 
facilitates the access to bank loans, especially for those, like women-led SMEs, who generally rely 
on informal financing channels (see, inter alia, Guiso et al., 2004; Albertazzi and Marchetti, 2010; 
Alesina et al., 2013; Guiso et al., 2013; Moro and Fink, 2013). In this respect, social capital in the 
credit market supposedly stimulates the opposite mechanisms generated by corruption (Uslaner, 
2013). 
																																								 																				
6 Social capital can be defined as the benefits obtained by individuals as members of a community or social network. 
For an illustration of the different dimensions of social capital see Coleman (1994) and, more recently, De Blasio et 
al. (2012). 
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In light of the aforementioned strands of the literature, we argue that corruption may modify 
both firms’ expectations about their possibility of being successful in demanding credit, and the 
level of trust required in the bank-firm relationship. We expect that this effect may be even 
greater for women-led firms, which may face more difficulties in managing their business and 
perceive corruption worse than men. All in all, in this paper we investigate whether in a less 
(more) corrupt environment, women-led SMEs face a lower (higher) probability to self-refrain 
from applying to bank credit compared to men-led peers. 
Using a sample of 60,058 observations – drawn from the ECB-SAFE – related to SMEs 
chartered in 11 Euro-area countries during the period 2009-2014, we first tackle the issue of 
gender bias in credit markets by employing multinomial logit models. Second, we address the 
possible endogeneity affecting the relation between the manager’s gender and the non-application 
reasons. This problem may arises because the choice of appointing a female manager could be 
driven by unobservable factors, such as a particular corporate culture characterizing the firm 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2014; Sila et al., 2016; Mascia and Rossi, 2017), rather than 
being exogenous. Therefore, to solve the potential endogeneity we employ a two-step approach 
with the use of an instrumental variable similarly to Cumming (2008), and Heger and Tykvová 
(2009). Third, in order to test our main hypothesis, we introduce an interaction term between the 
firm’s gender and corruption, thus to verify whether the surrounding environment affects the 
female firms’ propensity to demand bank credit.  
Our results show that female-led firms behave, more than male-led ones, as discouraged 
borrowers in the access to bank credit – as they anticipate a denial form the lender. Corruption 
(and conversely social capital) seems to have a negative (positive) impact on the access to bank 
credit, provided that firms are less confident about a positive outcome for their requests when 
corruption is higher. These findings are robust to various model specifications and are confirmed 
even after addressing endogeneity. As regards the link between the social environment and the 
enterprise’s gender, we find that corruption does not seem to drive the behaviour of firms with 
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regards to their propensity to avoid bank loans applications. This might be due to an intrinsic 
attitude of women in generally being more risk-averse and less confident about their 
entrepreneurial capabilities than men (Booth and Nolen, 2015; Caliendo et al., 2015; Carter et al., 
2015; Crosetto et al., 2015). 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we offer a review of two main strands of the 
literature. In Section 3, we illustrate the data and the methodology. The empirical results are 
discussed in Section 4, whereas Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature  
2.1 Corruption, credit access and gender  
Corruption7 is an important dimension of the quality of the institutions as most of the economic 
literature and institutional reports consider it as a major obstacle to social development and 
economic growth (see, among others, Myrdal, 1989; Andvig and Moene, 1990; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; La Porta et al., 1999; Li et al., 2000; Gyimah-Brempong, 2002; Tanzi 
and Davoodi, 2002; Blackburn and Sarmah, 2008; World Bank, 2007, 2011).8	
Corruption is harmful for competition, reduces the incentives to invest both domestically and 
from abroad and negatively misallocates public resources affecting the efficiency of public 
investments (Mauro, 1998; Tanzi and Davoodi, 2002; Gupta et al., 2001). Moreover, corruption 
reduces the level of trust in the institutions and among people (Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005; 
Uslaner, 2013) and produces uncertainty, thereby making the economic transactions more costly 
and inefficient, and negatively affecting the business environment (see, among others, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Blackburn and Sarmah, 2008; Hunt, 2005; Hunt and Laszlo, 
																																								 																				
7 Corruption is defined as the abuse, by a public officer, of his power to obtain a private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 
1975). 
8 On the contrary, another strand of literature argue that corruption conveys the market response to the inefficiencies 
of the public sector working as “grease” rather than “sand in the wheels”. This literature empirically predicts a non-
linear relation between corruption and economic growth at low levels of corruption incidence (see, among others, 
Lui, 1985; Klitgaard, 1988; Acemoglu and Verdier, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). 
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2005). In a highly corrupt environment, corruption damages especially the small and medium 
firms because of their limited financial resources, lower bargaining power, and more informal 
structure. Those features, indeed, make it very difficult for them to resist to the payment of 
bribes, whose burden per output is greater than for large firms (Svensson, 2003; Campos et al., 
2010; Gbetnkom, 2012; Seker and Yang, 2012; Van Vu et al., 2016; Galli et al., 2017b). 
In the literature on the determinants of corruption, gender is also considered a relevant issue. 
There is not a unanimous consensus about the link between gender and corruption; indeed, 
different perspectives are offered (see, in this regard, Agerberg, 2014; Wängnerud, 2014). Part of 
the literature	 (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Alatas et al., 2009; Melnykovska and 
Michailova, 2009; Esarey and Chirillo, 2013) develops the so-called gender differences 
perspective and argues that women, being more pro-social and risk-averse, are less inclined to 
engage in corrupt practices, perceive general corruption levels as worse, and are less tolerant 
towards the phenomenon. Moreover, in highly corrupt environments, women appear more 
socially vulnerable compared to men and face lower opportunities of business (Goetz, 2007). 
According to other studies (Sung, 2003, 2012), instead, liberal democracies favour both higher 
female participation in the political and economic life of a country and lower corruption. 
Therefore, no casual relation between gender and corruption can be assumed (the so-called 
liberal democracy perspective). Finally, some papers support the so-called opportunities 
perspective arguing that women are less likely to engage in corrupt practices because they still 
have fewer opportunities compared to men. In other words, in most countries women earn less 
money and have fewer responsibilities in public issues, as well as in business, which make them 
less likely to be involved in bribery (Alhassan-Alolo, 2007; Bjarnegård, 2013). 
Additionally, there is a branch of the literature that focuses on the role that social capital plays 
in the credit market whose functioning is based, among other things, on credibility and trust. By 
increasing the level of trust and reducing the asymmetric information characterizing credit 
contracts, social capital improves the credit conditions for firms – thereby easing their access to 
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bank loans (Uzzi, 1999; Guiso et al., 2004; Moro and Fink, 2013; Mistrulli and Vacca, 2015) – and 
facilitates the collection of soft information, which in turn reduces adverse selection and moral 
hazard phenomena. Consequently, a higher level of social capital facilitates the access to bank 
loans – especially for people and firms, like women-led ones, that generally use informal channels 
of finance (see Guiso et al., 2004; Alesina et al., 2013; Guiso et al., 2013). 
 
2.2 Gender and bank credit access 
Several studies have investigated whether the gender of the firm’s manager/owner affects the 
access conditions to credit. The empirical evidence is mixed and mostly driven by the country-
context. Part of the literature argues that women’s perception about the difficulties in access to 
bank credit explains their lower propensity to apply for external funding (Coleman, 2000; Cole 
and Mehran, 2011). Affecting the risk-taking behaviour, this perception itself may result in self-
restraint attitudes, by women-led firms, from applying for bank credit (see, inter alia, Robb and 
Walken, 2002; Babcock and Laschever, 2003; Roper and Scott, 2009; Carter et al., 2015; 
Malmström et al., 2017). Some studies, instead, attribute the existence of gender-based 
differences to the circumstance that women-led firms generally tend to be of small and medium 
size, operate in more traditional sectors such as the services, and are characterized by lower 
business management experience, resistance to provide collateral guarantees, and inclination in 
utilizing personal funds, retained earnings, home equity loans, and family loans to finance their 
businesses (Haines et al., 1999; Coleman, 2000; Treichel and Scott, 2006; Coleman and Robb, 
2009; Moro and Fink, 2013; Cole and Mehran, 2011; Sena et al., 2012). 
On the supply side, the literature investigates whether women-led firms face lower credit 
availability and/or worse cost conditions and provides mixed evidence.9 While some studies find 
that women-led enterprises have greater difficulties than man-led ones in obtaining bank loans 
																																								 																				
9 Please mind that the literature has also investigated other aspects of discrimination (such as the ethnic one) in the 
access to bank credit. See Aldén and Hammarstedt (2016) for an extensive review of the literature. 
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(Marlow and Patton, 2005; Becker-Blease and Sohl, 2007; Muravyev et al., 2009; Bellucci et al., 
2010; Kwong et al., 2012; Wu and Chua, 2012; Alsos and Ljunggren, 2016; Mascia and Rossi, 
2017), others exclude gender discrimination and attribute the differences in cost conditions to 
economic and financial factors such as credit history, assets, sales, and years in business 
(Cavalluzzo et al., 2002; Blanchflower et al., 2003). A few papers find that women-led firms face 
more unfavourable loan contract terms than male firms, motivated by the fact that the formers 
are less inclined to grow (Fabowale et al., 1995).  
Few papers have specifically addressed the issue of gender in credit markets utilizing 
European data. Stefani and Vacca (2015) investigate whether gender affects SMEs’ access to 
credit in the four largest European countries – Germany, France, Italy and Spain. They find that 
female firms face more difficulties than their male counterparts in accessing bank credit mostly 
because of their characteristics (firm size, age and sector of activity) rather than because of 
gender-discrimination. Moro et al. (2017) find that, on the demand side, women-led firms tend to 
apply less often than male-led ones, as they seem to be less confident about the outcome of their 
applications; on the supply side, banks mostly allocate loans according to the creditworthiness of 
the firm and do not seem to be gender-biased. 
In this paper we focus on the demand side of the European credit market to investigate 
whether the quality of the institutional environment differently affects female and male-led firms’ 
behaviour. Based on the abovementioned strands of the literature we enquire whether, in a less 
corrupt environment, female-led firms show lower discouragement in applying for bank loans 
than male-led ones. Therefore our research hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: In a less corrupt environment, women-led SMEs face a lower probability to self-refrain from 
applying to bank credit compared to men-led peers. 
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3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data description 
Our main source of data is represented by the SAFE,10 run on behalf of the European 
Commission (EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB) every six months (via the so-called 
waves), since 2009. It collects micro-data about firms’ financial needs, their experience in the 
access to finance, as well as a series of financial and other firm-level characteristics through a 
survey of companies chartered in Europe and randomly selected from the Dun & Bradstreet 
business register.11 Firms in agriculture, public administration, and financial services are 
intentionally excluded. Moreover, the sample is stratified by country, firm’s size and activity.  
Our analysis is limited to 9 waves of the survey (i.e., from the second to the tenth – 
corresponding to a period spanning from July 1, 2009, to March 31, 2014), because the key 
variable employed for our tests (i.e., the gender) is only available for those rounds. We restrict our 
study to the eleven largest Euro-area economies (i.e., Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain)12 – as they are also the ones 
for which the related firms’ observations are always available throughout the period of our 
investigation. In addition, it is worth noting that these countries, although belonging to the same 
currency area, are characterized by heterogeneities in terms of the micro and macroeconomic 
features, as well as in regards to the social-institutional environment. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of our observations by country, with France, Spain, Germany, 
and Italy displaying the highest values. 
– TABLE 1 HERE – 
  
																																								 																				
10 The survey is available at: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/surveys/sme/html/index.en.html 
11 For the countries where the Dun & Bradstreet register was not available, other sources were used. 
12 The smallest countries in the Eurozone (Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and 
Slovenia) represent less than 3% of the total employment in the area. Therefore we have decided to exclude them 
from the sample.	
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3.2  Dependent variable 
The outcome of the SAFE question q7a_a is employed to create the dependent variable for our 
study. Specifically, this question detects whether a firm applied for bank loans, as well as a series 
of reasons why it did not. More precisely, the question is: 
“[With regards to bank loans], could you please indicate whether you: (1) applied for them over the past 6 
months; (2) did not apply because you thought you would be rejected; (3) did not apply because you had sufficient 
internal funds; (4) or did not apply for other reasons?” 
The values from 1 to 4, outlined in parentheses, denote the way each interviewee’s answers 
were coded. Therefore we employ the qualitative data resulting from such question to generate 
our dependent variable that we label as “applying for bank loans”. 
 
3.3 Key variables 
3.3.1 Gender 
The SAFE collects information about the gender of the owner, director, or CEO of the surveyed 
firms from the second to the tenth wave (i.e., from July 1, 2009, to March 31, 2014). We thus 
employ such information to construct a dummy that represents the key part of our empirical 
analysis. Specifically, we create “Female” as a dichotomous variable equal to one if the 
owner/director/CEO of the firm is female, and zero if it is male. Figure 1 shows the percentage 
of female firms, in our sample, by country. Interestingly, we note that The Netherlands is the 
country with the lowest share of female firms (about 9.8%) in the sample. On the other hand, 
Germany and Portugal present the highest shares of female enterprises – about 14% and 14.6%, 
respectively. On average, female businesses cover about 12.5% of the sample. Such very modest 
figure – namely, the low percentage of female-led companies throughout our sample – may be 
due to the difficulties faced by women in reaching top managerial positions (Bush, 2011; 
Grosvold, 2011; Moro et al., 2017). 
– FIGURE 1 HERE – 
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3.3.2 Corruption 
Corruption erodes economic freedom by introducing insecurity and uncertainty into economic 
relationships. In the literature, two major alternative approaches to measuring corruption are 
developed: subjective indicators, based on survey data about corruption perceptions and/or 
experiences, and objective measures, such as the number of corruption-related trials or economic 
proxies. While the latter are appropriate for single-country analyses, the differences in the 
national judicial systems justify the use of the formers in case of cross-country studies (as it is our 
case). 
Therefore, for the scope of our investigation, two measures of corruption are alternatively 
utilized: “Freedom from Corruption” provided by the Heritage Foundation – whose score is 
primarily derived from Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) – and 
“Control of Corruption” drawn from the “Worldwide Governance Indicators”, available at the 
World Bank. For both variables, low values of the measure denote high corruption, whereas high 
values indicate low corruption. Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the degree of corruption by country 
according to the two indicators, respectively. Here we observe that Greece and Italy are the most 
corrupt economies, as they present the lowest values of the index. In contrast, Finland and the 
Netherlands, with the highest values, are the least corrupt countries in our sample. 
– FIGURE 2 and FIGURE 3 HERE – 
 
3.4 Econometric methodology and control variables 
In order to carry out our analyses, we employ multinomial logistic models.13 Such choice moves 
from the possibility i) to employ a discrete dependent variable that takes more than two 
outcomes (that have no natural ordering), and ii) to use both continuous as well as dichotomous 
																																								 																				
13 Multinomial logistic models are not uncommon in a variety of strands of the literature in business. See, for 
instance, Badoer and James (2016), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013), Ongena and Şendeniz-Yüncü (2011), Sievänen et al. 
(2017).	
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variables as regressors (see, for instance, Gregory et al., 2005). Regressions include time and 
country dummies or, alternatively, country*time dummies. Furthermore, we adjust the sample to 
be representative of the population from which it is extracted by employing calibrated weights (as 
in Ferrando et al., 2017). Finally, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are utilized to remove 
possible bias in the estimations. 
As outlined in H1, our analysis is aimed at investigating whether the different degree of 
corruption characterizing the countries of our sample plays a role in a female firm’s decision not 
to apply for bank loans. However, before doing so, we decide to carry out two preliminary steps. 
 
3.4.1 Exploring the existence of a causal relation 
Indeed, we first need to check whether women are more or less inclined than men in not-
applying for bank loans and whether the level of corruption, at the country level, is significantly 
correlated to the non-application reasons. To do so, we thus estimate the following model: 
Pi (applying for bank loans) = f (Female , corruption, country controls, firm characteristics)   (1) 
where we expect our ‘Female’ dummy to exhibit a positive sign, thus signalling a higher propensity 
by female-led businesses not to applying for fear of rejection and for other reasons. As specified 
earlier in Section 3.3.2, ‘corruption’ alternatively includes “Freedom from Corruption” or “Control 
of Corruption” indicators. ‘Firm characteristics’ is a vector containing standard controls (i.e., firm’s 
size, and age), some firm’s financial characteristics (i.e., the change in profitability and in credit 
history), as well as variations in the enterprise’s credit needs. The use of such controls, together 
with the dummies accounting for the country and the time effects, should reduce possible 
endogeneity problems arising from the data. More precisely, the standard controls are likely to 
reduce the potential cause of endogeneity by capturing the independent impact of firm-level 
heterogeneity related to size and age. In other words, including such variables in our models 
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allows us to alleviate potential worries that the possible variations observed in the probability to 
not applying for bank loans are driven from the firm specific characteristics rather than from the 
existence of gender disparities. The financial firm controls accounting for the change in 
profitability, in creditworthiness and in the firm’s demand for credit, in the past six months, are 
also meant to reduce the effect of potential sources of bias that could affect our models. Notably, 
the change in profit is aimed at capturing variations of the firm profitability. We expect that the 
firms that improved their income statements in the previous six months are less likely not to 
applying for bank credit for fear of rejection; conversely, firms that worsened their profitability 
are more likely to be discouraged from applying. We capture the change in profit by generating 
the following two dummies: profit up (equal to 1 if a firm declares that the profit has increased 
over the past six months) and profit down (equal to 1 if a firm declares that the profit has 
decreased over the past six months). Furthermore, we control for the credit history of the 
enterprises in our sample. Specifically, we would expect that firms that improved (worsened) their 
creditworthiness over time might be less (more) likely to refrain from applying for bank loans. 
Following the procedure described above, we build two dummies accounting for the change in 
the firms’ credit history: creditworthiness up (equal to 1 if the firms declare that the 
creditworthiness has increased over the past six months) and creditworthiness down (equal to 1 if 
the firms declare that the creditworthiness has decreased over the past six months). In addition, 
we control for the variations in the firm’s need for credit by including two additional dummies. 
Namely, we generate: demand up (equal to 1 if a firm declares an increase in the need for bank 
loans over the past six months) and demand down (equal to 1 if a firm declares a decrease in the 
need for bank loans over the past six months). Please mind that all these dummies are not 
capturing the level of demand for bank loans, profitability and creditworthiness. Rather, they offer 
a picture of the perceived change of each of them from the interviewee’s perspective. Finally, the 
‘country controls’ include a wide set of variables controlling for the country features. First of all, we 
include the biannual GDP growth rate – that we compute as averages of quarterly data drawn 
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from OECD – to account for the general economic conditions. Moreover, our regressions 
include “Trade Freedom”, which is a variable drawn from the Heritage Foundation, to account 
for the absence of regulatory barriers to trade. We expect that firms chartered in countries 
characterized by a higher trade freedom are less inclined in refraining from applying for bank 
loans. A variable accounting for the quality of contract enforcement and property rights, drawn 
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators available at the World Bank, is also included and 
labelled as “Rule of Law”. The idea is that where the confidence in the rules of society is higher, 
the enterprises are less likely to be discouraged from applying for fear of being credit constrained 
and to resort to alternative channels. Our specifications also include a control that proxies for the 
level of reliance of the private sector towards the banking industry. Specifically, we include 
“Domestic credit to private sector by banks”, which is computed as percentage of GDP and 
drawn from the World Bank. The Global Gender Gap Index (GGGI),14 drawn from the World 
Economic Forum, is also added to our models as a proxy for social capital. We thus expect that 
the higher the index, the lower the probability that a firm may be discouraged from applying for 
fear of being credit constrained or to resort to alternative channels of finance. Finally, we include 
the Herfindahl Index (HI) of bank total assets concentration to account for the competition in 
the banking industry. The idea is that, when the bank concentration is higher, because of the 
lower banking competition firms are more likely to behave as discouraged as they anticipate a 
possible rejection. 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of the variables employed in our analysis. Table A1 in 
Appendix, instead, provides variables’ description and sources. 
– TABLE 2 HERE – 
 
																																								 																				
14 Low values of the GGGI underline higher gender disparities, whereas high values of the same index underscore 
higher gender equality.	
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3.4.2 Addressing endogeneity 
Endogeneity may be a source of concern in our analysis. Indeed, the firm’s leadership gender may 
not be completely exogenous. Either reverse causality – the level of credit rationing may impact 
on the firm performance and, thus, on the choice of the leader to be hired – or omitted variables 
– namely, unobservable organizational and managerial skills, or a given corporate culture may 
push towards a given leader rather than another – can affect our estimates (see, inter alia, Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al. 2014; Sila et al. 2016; Mascia and Rossi, 2017). If this is the case, we 
cannot argue that our results are showing the existence of a causal relation between the leader’s 
gender and the probability of non-application to bank credit. 
To face such potential issue, similarly to Cumming (2008) and Heger and Tykvová (2009) we 
utilize a two-step approach. This technique requires us to employ a logit model to study the 
determinants of our Female dummy, in the first stage. Notably, for identification purposes, we 
need an instrument that is highly correlated with the Female dummy and is not correlated with 
the error term. A good candidate, in this regard, can be the share of female employment by sector 
of activity available at Eurostat (see, for instance, Mascia and Rossi, 2017). Therefore, we regress 
Female on the rate of female employment and a variety of firm and country controls from model 
(1). Afterwards, in the second and final step, we estimate model (1) by employing our 
multinomial logistic setting where, in lieu of the Female dummy, we include the predicted values 
obtained from the first step. 
 
3.4.3 Assessing whether corruption influences women-led firms’ decision not to apply 
Once carried out the previous steps, if a causal effect between the leader’s gender and the non-
application for bank loans has been detected, then we are finally legitimised to test our research 
hypothesis. 
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To do so, we decide to utilize interaction models. Namely, we take model (1) and add an 
interaction term between our Female dummy and one of the alternative proxies for corruption, 
thus to check whether different degrees of corruption at the country-level may influence 
women’s discouragement in applying for bank loans. More specifically, in order to avoid 
multicollinearity between the interaction term and its constituent variables, we mean-centre the 
corruption measures before including them in our models. By mean centring, we basically 
transform the original corruption measures into deviations from their mean (see Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2013). 
Our expectation is that, in a better environment (i.e., where corruption is lower), female firms 
are more confident about the success of their applications and tend to refrain less – than it would 
happen in a more corrupt environment – from applying for bank loans. Alternatively, we may 
find that women’s discouragement is independent of the surrounding environment and female 
leaders tend to self-refrain, more than male ones, just because of their intrinsic attitude in being 
less confident about their entrepreneurial capabilities as well as in being more risk-averse (Booth 
and Nolen, 2015; Caliendo et al., 2015; Carter et al., 2015; Crosetto et al., 2015). 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Baseline specifications 
We now discuss the results of the multinomial logistic model presented in Section 3.4.1. As 
specified earlier, the use of such methodology is ideal when the dependent variable takes more 
than two qualitative outcomes with no natural ordering. Additionally, when employing such a 
method, we need to specify a base outcome against which comparing the remaining outcomes of 
the dependent variable. For this reason, we decide to compare the motives that lead firms not to 
apply for bank loans (i.e., non-application ‘for fear of rejection’, ‘for sufficient funds’, ‘for other 
reasons’) against the base outcome ‘applied’. Table 3 shows the results of three different 
specifications of model (1) that we carried out utilizing ‘Freedom from corruption’ or ‘Control of 
	 17 
corruption’ as alternative proxies for corruption, in Panel A and Panel B respectively. Starting 
from the left-hand side of the Table (both Panels), the first test is carried out on a baseline 
specification that does not include any country-level control apart from the corruption measure. 
The specification that appears in the centre of the Table, instead, adds all the country-level 
controls (i.e., GDP growth, Trade freedom, Rule of Low, Domestic credit to private sector by 
banks over GDP, the GGGI, and the HI of bank concentration) to the previous specification. 
Finally, in the last Columns of the Table we report a robustness test where, in lieu of the country-
level variables, we insert country*time dummies. 
Starting from Panel A of Table 3, estimates highlight that the dummy Female always presents a 
positive and significant coefficient, indicating that women-led businesses are more likely than 
their male counterparts to self-refrain from applying for bank loans due to fear of rejection, to 
availability of sufficient internal funds, and for other reasons (as they probably prefer to relying 
on family or friends networks). It is also worthy of note that the marginal effects reported in 
brackets underscore that women-led businesses appear to be 6.3% more likely than men-led ones 
to self-refrain from applying to bank credit for fear of rejection. Our results seem to be strongly 
significant whether we do not employ country-level controls (first specification), or when we 
include them (second specification), as well as when – to rule out the possibility that our results 
are driven by the choice of the country controls included – we check the robustness of our 
findings by dropping the country-level variables and employing country*time effects (third 
specification). 
As regards the corruption measure, the variable “Freedom from corruption” turns to be 
significantly and negatively correlated to our dependent variable almost in all specifications, 
especially with regards to the non-application for fear of rejection. Indeed, this result is stable 
across the various specifications presented in Table 3. In other words, this finding seems to 
highlight that in countries characterized by a lower degree of corruption (i.e., higher freedom 
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from corruption), SMEs appear to be more confident about the success of their loan applications 
and, therefore, they are less likely to self-refrain from applying to bank credit for fear of rejection. 
– TABLE 3 HERE – 
As for the other controls included in the various specifications, it is worth mentioning that, 
consistently with our expectations, the dummies “Profit down” and “Credit down” exhibit 
positive coefficients in Columns 2, 6, and 10, signalling that firms that have decreased their profit 
and creditworthiness in the last six months are more likely to self-refrain from applying as they 
anticipate a rejection from the lender. In contrast, firms that experienced an improvement of the 
credit history – as proxied by the dummy “Creditworthiness up” – are generally less likely to 
refrain from applying for credit. 
If we then focus on the specification outlined in the centre of the Table, some interesting 
insights also emerge from the coefficients related to the country-level controls. Indeed, here we 
find that firms chartered in countries with greater confidence in the rules of society (as proxied 
by “Rule of law”) and higher trade freedom are less likely to refrain from applying for bank loans 
for fear of rejection. As regards the bank concentration, in contrast to our expectations this 
variable exhibits a negative and significant coefficient in Column 6, meaning that, when the bank 
competition is lower, firms do not appear to anticipate a rejection from the lender and, as such, 
do not seem to be discouraged from applying for credit. This may be explained by the so-called 
information hypothesis, which argues that, in more concentrated markets, banks have higher 
incentives to create durable businesses with their borrowers – thus eventually increasing the 
firms’ confidence towards the banking system (see, for instance, Fungáčová et al., 2017). 
Moving to Panel B, here we observe that the previous findings are confirmed even when we 
employ “Control of corruption” as an alternative proxy for the degree of corruption 
characterizing the environment. Specifically, the Female dummy enters all the specifications with a 
positive and significant sign, thus confirming the higher likelihood of women-led enterprises, 
compared to men, to not applying for credit for the variety of reasons investigated. As for the 
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corruption indicator, we almost find that its coefficient is negatively correlated to the probability 
of not applying for fear of rejection (see Columns 2, 6, and 10) – which confirms that when 
corruption is lower firms tend to be less discouraged from applying for credit. Finally, as for the 
country-level controls, it is worth mentioning that in Column 6 the GGGI enters with a negative 
and significant sign, suggesting that when the perceived gender disparities are lower (i.e., a 
country’s social capital is higher), firms seem to be more confident towards the banking system 
and, as such, are less inclined in not applying to bank credit for fear of rejection. 
Overall, our findings show that women-led enterprises tend to self-refrain, more than men, 
from applying for credit. Additionally, results seem to highlight that a higher quality institutional 
environment – as measured in terms of lower corruption – helps firms to gain confidence about 
their abilities in being successful in case of a loan application is filed, thus reducing their potential 
discouragement. For this reason – after addressing (in the next Section) potential endogeneity 
problems affecting our estimates –, in the subsequent Section we decide to further explore this 
issue and test whether, eventually, the external environment actually influences the behaviour of 
female-led firms with regards to their inclination in applying for bank loans. 
 
4.2 Addressing endogeneity 
As anticipated in Section 3.4.2, endogeneity may be a source of concern in our investigation. To 
address this issue we employ a two-step approach in a similar fashion to Cumming (2008), and 
Heger and Tykvová (2009). More specifically, such an approach requires us to first identify an 
instrument for our Female dummy. In this regard, the share of female employment by sector of 
activity appears to be a good candidate for our purpose. However, because some of the 
observations within the SAFE refer to firms that are not classified within any sector of activity, 
when implementing such methodology we face a minor drop of observations that leads us to a 
sample of 57,885 rows. 
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Table 4 reports the results of the final stage of our two-step approach, where we estimate 
model (1) through the use of a multinomial logistic model that – rather than utilizing the original 
Female dummy – employs the predicted value of Female that we acquire from the first step 
logistic estimation.15 As we did in the previous Table, we report the tests carried out utilizing 
three specifications of model (1) – namely, without country-level controls (left-hand side of the 
Table), with the inclusion of all the country variables (centre of the Table) and, as a robustness 
check, with the use of country*time dummies in lieu of the country controls (right-hand side of 
the Table). Finally, the various specifications reported in Panel A differ from those in Panel B for 
the different indicator of corruption utilized – “Freedom from corruption” versus “Control of 
corruption”, respectively. 
– TABLE 4 HERE – 
Results from both Panels of the Table show that, even after addressing the endogeneity 
concerns, Female enters all the specifications with a significant and positive coefficient, indicating 
that women-led businesses are more likely than men-led ones to avoid loan applications either for 
fear of rejection, or for sufficient internal funds, as well as for other reasons, as compared to the 
base outcome ‘applied’. Such a result does not appear to be driven by the choice of including, or 
not, the country-level controls, and is also robust to the use of country*time fixed effects. 
Overall, even after modifying our regressions to overcome the possible endogeneity issue 
affecting our estimates, results confirm the existence of a self-restraint attitude, by women-led 
enterprises, in demanding credit. Additionally, the negative sign associated to the coefficient of 
the corruption indicators seems to corroborate the view according to which the better the 
external environment, the lower the probability that a firm is discouraged from applying for fear 
of being credit constrained. 
All in all, having ascertained that the leadership gender actually matters in the firm’s 
propensity not to apply for bank loans, we have finally laid the groundwork to test our main 
																																								 																				
15 For the sake of brevity, we do not report the estimates of the first logistic step, where we find that the instrument 
has a highly significant positive impact (at the 1% level) on the probability of female leadership.	
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research question. Namely, we are now legitimized to assess whether a better external 
environment surrounding the firm may possibly help female leaders in reducing their 
discouragement when they have to deal with credit institutions.  
 
4.3 Assessing whether corruption affects women-led firms’ decisions 
As described in Section 3.4.3, in order to check whether the institutional environment might 
influence women’s propensity in not applying for bank credit, we add – to model (1) – an 
interaction term between our Female dummy and one of the alternative proxies for corruption. 
Specifically, in Table 5 we present the results in a similar fashion to what we did in the previous 
Tables. Namely, we start without including any country-level control apart from the corruption 
measure (left-hand side of the Table), then we add all the country variables (centre of the Table), 
finally we check the robustness of our tests by substituting the country controls with the 
country*time dummies (right-hand side of the Table). Moreover, Panel A and Panel B only differ 
for the type of corruption indicator utilized (i.e., “Freedom from corruption” versus “Control of 
corruption”, respectively). In addition, please remind that both corruption measures are mean-
centred to avoid multicollinearity between the interaction term and its constituent variables. All in 
all, if H1 is corroborated, we should find a significant coefficient for the interaction term, thus 
signalling that corruption eventually represents an obstacle for the access to bank credit by 
women. 
Table 5 displays the results of our empirical analysis. While we observe that the Female dummy 
always remains positive and highly statistically significant and we note that the corruption 
measures are negatively correlated to our dependent variable, interestingly – and in contrast to 
our expectations – the interaction term does not turn to be significant in any of the specifications 
reported in the Table. This result seems to suggest that women-led SMEs are more likely than 
men-led ones not to applying for credit regardless of the level of corruption characterizing the 
country where the firm is chartered. Notably, the evidence emerging from our analysis seems also 
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to reveal that women’s discouragement in applying to bank credit for fear of rejection is mostly 
driven by the intrinsic attitude of women in being less confident about their abilities in dealing 
with banks (Carter et al., 2015), rather than by the country’s level of corruption. This is 
particularly unfortunate because, even when the institutional environment does not seem to 
obstacle firms (as it should be when corruption is low), in holding such a conduct female 
enterprises preclude themselves the possibility to expand and let their businesses grow. Ideally, 
female owners/managers should gain more confidence about their bargaining abilities with banks 
thus to refrain less from applying for credit and eventually being even more successful with their 
businesses. 
– TABLE 5 HERE – 
Some additional tests have been performed to assess the robustness of our findings. First of 
all, to rule out the possibility that the vector of country and time dummies that we included in 
our specifications might generate collinearity with the country-level controls, we have re-run our 
regressions by excluding such dummies. Additionally, as a further check, we have re-estimated 
the various specifications of model (1) by including industry effects (i.e., the dummies accounting 
for the firms’ sector of activity). In both cases, results – that we do not report for the sake of 
brevity – confirm our findings.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Accessing formal channels of credit, such as the bank lending one, is pivotal for the successful 
management of SMEs, given their inability to entry equity markets. In addition, the external 
environment surrounding the enterprises – in terms of quality of the institutions and social 
capital – may also play a role in the firms’ attitude towards bank credit, thus impacting on their 
possibility to grow. Notably, we think that corruption may negatively modify firms’ expectations 
about the propensity of banks to finance their projects, thus affecting the level of trust 
characterizing the bank-firm relationship. These issues are of particular concern for the 
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enterprises led by women, because they may perceive corruption as an obstacle, more than men 
do, and consequently feel less confident in managing their businesses. 
This paper is thus an attempt to address the question of whether the perceived level of 
corruption in a country influences women’s inclination in self-refraining from applying for bank 
loans for a variety of motives (i.e., fear of rejection, sufficient funds, other reasons). To this end 
we utilize a sample of 60,058 observations – drawn from the ECB-SAFE – related to SMEs 
chartered in 11 Euro-area countries during the period 2009-2014. 
Overall, our findings – robust to different model specifications – show that i) women-led 
enterprises seem to self-refrain, more than men, from applying for bank loans and this result still 
holds even after addressing potential endogeneity problems affecting our estimates; ii) the quality 
of the institutional environment – as proxied by corruption – is significantly correlated to the 
probability that SMEs do not apply for bank credit (i.e., the better the environment, the lower the 
probability of non-application); iii) the self-restraint attitudes of women-led businesses towards 
bank credit do not appear to be influenced by the surrounding environment (i.e., although 
chartered in an ideally better environment, female-led SMEs keep refraining from applying for 
fear of rejection and other reasons). In other words, our empirical analysis highlights that 
women-led firms generally tend to refrain from applying for loans, more than men, regardless of 
the level of corruption in a country. This result confirms theories emphasizing the greater risk-
aversion generally characterizing women’s behaviour. 
Our results suggest that measures addressing women-led businesses may be crucial in helping 
female leaders in gaining more confidence about their entrepreneurial capabilities and their 
bargaining abilities with banks, thus to refrain less from applying for credit and eventually 
ensuring the possibility to grow and being even more successful with their businesses. Moreover, 
our findings indicate that anti-corruption policies and measures aimed to enhance transparency 
and reduce information asymmetry in the economy may play a relevant role in reducing the 
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negative spillovers generated by a low-quality institutional environment on SMEs access to bank 
credit. 
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Figure 1: Percentage of female firms by country 
 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, 
GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, PT = Portugal. 
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Figure 2: Freedom from corruption by country 
 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, 
GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, PT = Portugal. 
 
 
Figure 3: Control of corruption by country 
 
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, 
GR = Greece, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, NL = The Netherlands, PT = Portugal.  
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Table 1: Observations by country 
 
Country Name Freq. Percent 
   
Austria 3,800 6.33 
Belgium 3,642 6.06 
Finland 3,643 6.07 
France 8,921 14.85 
Germany 8,670 14.44 
Greece 3,849 6.41 
Ireland 3,382 5.63 
Italy 8,043 13.39 
Netherlands 3,670 6.11 
Portugal 3,734 6.22 
Spain 8,704 14.49 
   
Total 60,058 100.00 
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Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
 Observations Mean Median St. Dev. p1 p99 
       
Dependent  var iable        
Applying for bank loans  60,058  2.625 3.000 1.085 1.000 4.000 
       
Key var iable        
Female  60,058  0.125 0.000 0.331 0.000 1.000 
       
Corrupt ion        
Freedom from corruption  60,058  67.556 69.000 15.783 34.000 94.000 
Control of corruption  60,058  1.197 1.420 0.713 -0.250 2.220 
       
Country - l eve l  contro l s        
GDP growth rate  60,058  -0.188 0.300 2.675 -8.200 5.050 
Trade freedom  60,058  86.037 87.100 2.160 80.800 87.600 
Rule of law  60,058  1.282 1.430 0.506 0.360 1.970 
Domestic credit by banks  60,058  133.621 116.834 38.873 89.313 207.619 
GGGI  60,058  0.733 0.733 0.042 0.672 0.845 
Concentration  60,058  0.091 0.060 0.079 0.021 0.370 
       
Firm-leve l  (SAFE) contro l s        
Demand up  60,058  0.190 0.000 0.392 0.000 1.000 
Demand down  60,058  0.135 0.000 0.341 0.000 1.000 
Profit up  60,058  0.246 0.000 0.431 0.000 1.000 
Profit down  60,058  0.466 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Creditworthiness up  60,058  0.213 0.000 0.409 0.000 1.000 
Creditworthiness down  60,058  0.141 0.000 0.348 0.000 1.000 
Micro  60,058  0.336 0.000 0.472 0.000 1.000 
Small  60,058  0.337 0.000 0.473 0.000 1.000 
Medium  60,058  0.254 0.000 0.436 0.000 1.000 
Very recent  60,058  0.017 0.000 0.127 0.000 1.000 
Recent  60,058  0.066 0.000 0.248 0.000 1.000 
Old  60,058  0.126 0.000 0.332 0.000 1.000 
 
 
Table 3: The impact of gender on the non-application reasons 
This table displays regression results for the multinomial logistic model presented in Section 3.4.1, concerning the impact of gender on the reasons for not applying to bank credit. The 
estimation period is 1st July 2009 – 31st March 2014 (from the second to the tenth of the SAFE waves). The dependent variable – which is also described in Section 3.2 – is a variable that 
equals one/two/three/four if a firm applied/did not apply because of possible rejection/did not apply because of sufficient internal funds/did not apply for other reasons during the past 
six months, respectively. Female is a dummy that equals one if the firm’s owner/director/CEO is female, and zero otherwise. Panel A (Panel B) controls for a country’s level of corruption 
by including, as regressor, “Freedom from corruption” (“Control of corruption”). Although not reported, controls for the firm’s size and age are always included. See Table A1 in the 
Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, regressions in Columns 1–
8 include country and time dummies; whereas regressions in Columns 9–12 include country*time dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Marginal 
effects are reported in brackets. Intercepts are included but not reported. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
             
Female (base) 0.301*** 0.119** 0.124** (base) 0.295*** 0.118** 0.127** (base) 0.299*** 0.116** 0.125** 
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
  [0.063] [0.471] [0.199]  [0.063] [0.471] [0.199]  [0.063] [0.471] [0.199] 
             
Freedom from corruption  -0.091*** -0.024*** -0.013  -0.092*** -0.025** 0.012  -0.059* 0.009 -0.045** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
GDP growth      0.109*** 0.036* -0.058***     
      (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)     
Trade freedom      -0.112* 0.112** -0.036     
      (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)     
Rule of law      -4.899*** -0.934 -1.231*     
      (0.95) (0.68) (0.72)     
Domestic credit by banks      0.016*** -0.007** 0.009***     
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
GGGI      -4.021 -0.133 -6.222**     
      (3.59) (2.29) (2.47)     
Concentration      -8.683*** 0.124 5.291**     
      (3.05) (2.27) (2.35)     
Demand up  -1.085*** -2.910*** -2.172***  -1.097*** -2.912*** -2.173***  -1.100*** -2.922*** -2.174*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Demand down  -0.171* -0.330*** -0.387***  -0.169* -0.330*** -0.386***  -0.173* -0.328*** -0.382*** 
  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) 
Profit up  -0.116 0.003 -0.156***  -0.125 -0.001 -0.159***  -0.135 0.001 -0.161*** 
  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) 
Profit down  0.183*** -0.098** 0.138***  0.187*** -0.090** 0.136***  0.186*** -0.092** 0.134*** 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) 
Creditworthiness up  -0.342*** -0.263*** -0.397***  -0.334*** -0.264*** -0.395***  -0.315*** -0.266*** -0.400*** 
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
Creditworthiness down  0.400*** -0.840*** -0.356***  0.413*** -0.836*** -0.356***  0.418*** -0.833*** -0.349*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
             
Observations 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 
Firm’s size and age controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Country*Time dummies         YES YES YES YES 
             
Panel B             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Applied Did_not_apply_b Did_not_apply_b Did_not_apply_f Applied Did_not_apply_b Did_not_apply_b Did_not_apply_f Applied Did_not_apply_b Did_not_apply_b Did_not_apply_f
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ecause_of_possib
l 
ecause_of_suffici or_other_reasons ecause_of_possib
l 
ecause_of_suffici or_other_reasons ecause_of_possib
l 
ecause_of_suffici or_other_reasons 
             
Female (base) 0.301*** 0.120** 0.125** (base) 0.296*** 0.119** 0.127** (base) 0.299*** 0.116** 0.125** 
  (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) 
  [0.063] [0.471] [0.199]  [0.063] [0.471] [0.199]  [0.063] [0.471] [0.199] 
             
Control of corruption  -1.679*** -0.425 -0.710**  -1.223** 0.142 -0.566  -1.394* 0.223 -1.059** 
  (0.42) (0.29) (0.34)  (0.49) (0.31) (0.37)  (0.78) (0.36) (0.42) 
GDP growth      0.075*** 0.025 -0.049***     
      (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)     
Trade freedom      -0.062 0.143*** -0.068*     
      (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)     
Rule of law      -4.004*** -1.036 -0.656     
      (1.05) (0.69) (0.72)     
Domestic credit by banks      0.027*** -0.005 0.009**     
      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)     
GGGI      -9.207** -0.937 -6.565***     
      (3.75) (2.28) (2.46)     
Concentration      -0.262 2.703 4.602**     
      (2.69) (1.97) (2.07)     
Demand up  -1.079*** -2.909*** -2.171***  -1.093*** -2.911*** -2.173***  -1.100*** -2.922*** -2.174*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Demand down  -0.171* -0.329*** -0.386***  -0.167* -0.329*** -0.386***  -0.173* -0.328*** -0.382*** 
  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) 
Profit up  -0.107 0.004 -0.157***  -0.115 0.002 -0.161***  -0.135 0.001 -0.161*** 
  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.09) (0.05) (0.06) 
Profit down  0.193*** -0.095** 0.140***  0.192*** -0.088** 0.135***  0.186*** -0.092** 0.134*** 
  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)  (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) 
Creditworthiness up  -0.348*** -0.264*** -0.397***  -0.338*** -0.265*** -0.395***  -0.315*** -0.266*** -0.400*** 
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) 
Creditworthiness down  0.411*** -0.835*** -0.353***  0.420*** -0.834*** -0.356***  0.418*** -0.833*** -0.349*** 
  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
             
Observations 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 
Pseudo R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 
Firm’s size and age controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Country*Time dummies         YES YES YES YES 
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Table 4: The impact of gender on the non-application reasons – Two-step multinomial logistic analysis 
This table displays regression results of the final stage of the two-step multinomial logistic model discussed in Section3.4.2, concerning the impact of gender on the reasons for not applying 
to bank credit. The estimation period is 1st July 2009 – 31st March 2014 (from the second to the tenth of the SAFE waves). The dependent variable – which is also described in Section 3.2 
– is a variable that equals one/two/three/four if a firm applied/did not apply because of possible rejection/did not apply because of sufficient internal funds/did not apply for other 
reasons during the past six months, respectively. Here, the variable Female contains predicted values of the Female dummy obtained from an unreported first step logistic estimation. 
Panel A (Panel B) controls for a country’s level of corruption by including, as regressor, “Freedom from corruption” (“Control of corruption”). Although not reported, all regressions 
include controls for the firm’s demand for credit, profitability, creditworthiness, size, and age. Additionally, regressions in Columns 5–8 include a vector of country-level controls (i.e., GDP 
growth, Trade freedom, Rule of law, Domestic credit by banks, GGGI, Concentration). See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and sources. All regressions use sampling 
weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, regressions in Columns 1–8 include country and time dummies; whereas regressions in Columns 9–12 
include country*time dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at 
the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
             
Female (base) 0.865*** 4.004*** 3.516*** (base) 0.681* 3.977*** 3.528*** (base) 0.675* 3.955*** 3.466*** 
  (0.33) (0.91) (0.57)  (0.38) (0.93) (0.58)  (0.40) (0.95) (0.61) 
Freedom from corruption  -0.083** -0.025** -0.017  -0.079** -0.031*** -0.002  -0.067*** 0.016*** -0.046*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
             
Country-level controls     YES YES YES YES     
SAFE controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
             
Observations 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 
Pseudo R-squared 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.131 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Country*Time dummies         YES YES YES YES 
             
Panel B             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
             
Female  (base) 0.812** 3.993*** 3.493*** (base) 0.654* 3.980*** 3.517*** (base) 0.675* 3.955*** 3.466*** 
  (0.38) (0.93) (0.60)  (0.41) (0.94) (0.59)  (0.40) (0.95) (0.61) 
Control of corruption  -1.729 -0.464 -1.060***  -1.600* 0.066 -1.055***  -1.573*** 0.384*** -1.094*** 
  (1.23) (0.41) (0.34)  (0.91) (0.46) (0.29)  (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) 
             
Country-level controls     YES YES YES YES     
SAFE controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
             
Observations 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 57,885 
Pseudo R-squared 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.129 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.130 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Country*Time dummies         YES YES YES YES 
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Table 5: The impact of corruption on the female-led firm’s non-application reasons 
This table displays regression results for the multinomial logistic model presented in Section 3.4.1, where we assess whether corruption influences female-led firms’ decision not to apply for 
bank credit. The estimation period is 1st July 2009 – 31st March 2014 (from the second to the tenth of the SAFE waves). The dependent variable – which is also described in Section 3.2 – 
is a variable that equals one/two/three/four if a firm applied/did not apply because of possible rejection/did not apply because of sufficient internal funds/did not apply for other reasons 
during the past six months, respectively. Female is a dummy that equals one if the firm’s owner/director/CEO is female, and zero otherwise. Panel A (Panel B) controls for a country’s 
level of corruption by including, as regressor, mean-centred values – to avoid multicollinearity with its interactions – of “Freedom from corruption” (“Control of corruption”). Although 
not reported, all regressions include controls for the firm’s demand for credit, profitability, creditworthiness, size, and age. Additionally, regressions in Columns 5–8 include a vector of 
country-level controls (i.e., GDP growth, Trade freedom, Rule of law, Domestic credit by banks, GGGI, Concentration). See Table A1 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and 
sources. All regressions use sampling weights that adjust the sample to be representative of the population. Additionally, regressions in Columns 1–8 include country and time dummies; 
whereas regressions in Columns 9–12 include country*time dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Intercepts are included but not reported. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
Panel A             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
             
Female (base) 0.315*** 0.118** 0.120** (base) 0.309*** 0.117** 0.122** (base) 0.313*** 0.115** 0.119** 
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) 
Freedom from corruption  -0.092*** -0.023*** -0.012  -0.093*** -0.025** 0.012  -0.060* 0.010 -0.045** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female * Freedom from corr.  0.004 -0.002 -0.002  0.004 -0.002 -0.002  0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
             
Country-level controls     YES YES YES YES     
SAFE controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
             
Observations 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 
Pseudo R-squared 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.140 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Country*Time dummies         YES YES YES YES 
             
Panel B             
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
Applied Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_possib
l 
Did_not_apply_b
ecause_of_suffici 
Did_not_apply_f
or_other_reasons 
             
Female (base) 0.310*** 0.120** 0.124** (base) 0.306*** 0.119** 0.126** (base) 0.308*** 0.116** 0.124** 
  (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) 
Control of corruption  -1.689*** -0.420 -0.709**  -1.235** 0.146 -0.564  -1.404* 0.226 -1.058** 
  (0.42) (0.29) (0.34)  (0.49) (0.31) (0.37)  (0.78) (0.36) (0.42) 
Female * Control of corr.  0.074 -0.047 -0.013  0.083 -0.044 -0.018  0.075 -0.033 -0.016 
  (0.11) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.07) (0.08)  (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) 
             
Country-level controls     YES YES YES YES     
SAFE controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
             
Observations 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 60,058 
Pseudo R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.139 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.141 0.148 0.148 0.148 0.148 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES     
Country*Time dummies         YES YES YES YES 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable descriptions and sources 
Variables Description Source 
   Dependent  var iable    
Applying for bank loans Variable that equals one/two/three/four if (considering the bank loans) a firm applied/did not apply because of possible rejection/did not apply because of sufficient internal funds/did not apply for other reasons during the past six months, respectively. ECB: SAFE 
   
Key var iable    
Female Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s owner/director/CEO is female, and zero otherwise. ECB: SAFE 
   
Corrupt ion   
Freedom from corruption The higher the level of corruption, the lower the level of overall economic freedom and the lower a country’s score. Heritage Foundation 
Control of corruption The higher the level of corruption, the lower a country’s score. Worldwide Governance Indicators 
   
Country - l eve l  contro l s    
GDP growth The annual growth rate of real GDP based on averages of quarterly data for each survey round. OECD 
Trade freedom A measure of a country’s trade freedom. Heritage Foundation 
Rule of law An indicator that reflects the perceptions about the quality of contract enforcement and property rights. Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Domestic credit by banks The share of domestic credit provided to the private sector by banks, as percentage of GDP. World Bank 
GGGI An index designed to measure a country’s gender equality. World Economic Forum 
Concentration The Herfindahl index (HI) of total assets concentration (for the banking sector). ECB: Data Warehouse 
   
Firm-leve l  (SAFE) contro l s    
Demand up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s needs of bank loan increased in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Demand down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s needs of bank loan decreased in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Profit up Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced an increase of the net income after taxes in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Profit down Dummy variable that equals one if a firm experienced a decrease of the net income after taxes in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Creditworthiness up Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s credit history improved in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Creditworthiness down Dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s credit history worsened in the past six months. ECB: SAFE 
Micro Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has between 1 and 9 employees. ECB: SAFE 
Small Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has between 10 and 49 employees. ECB: SAFE 
Medium Dummy variable that equals one if the firm has between 50 and 249 employees. ECB: SAFE 
Very recent Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is less than 2 years old. ECB: SAFE 
Recent Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is between 2 and 5 years old. ECB: SAFE 
Old Dummy variable that equals one if the firm is between 5 and 10 years old. ECB: SAFE 
 
 
